The South China Sea region has emerged in the 21 st century as an area of unrivalled economic activity, significant natural resources, and a global hub of seaborne commerce.
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The recent pivot in American foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific basin acknowledges new geopolitical realities: the center of the global economy has shifted and the region is struggling for balance amidst contending powers. The fact that Asia will dominate this century economically is clear-its economies are projected to expand to 37% of world GDP in 2014, 1 and the region will trade places to top the West in all measures of economic power within the span of a single generation, from 1990 to 2030. 2 Unfortunately, Asia also lacks a comprehensive security arrangement, and nowhere is the need for cooperation and regional stability more pressing than in the South China Sea (SCS). Despite its modest size, the Sea is "a mass of connective economic tissue where global sea routes coalesce" around the demographic hub of the 21st-century world economy. 3 As Southeast Asian states interact with growing Chinese diplomatic, economic, and military power in the region, the SCS is likely to become a strategic bellwether for continued U.S. leadership in the western Pacific along with unfettered global access to the Sea. 4 A number of issues in the SCS-natural resource development, freedom of navigation, and sovereignty disputes-create a backdrop of strategic regional competition against which the coastal nations in Figure 1 below must balance a rising Chinese neighbor and a distant American hegemon. Current U.S. strategy for the region is largely rhetorical and unlikely to solve any of the aforementioned core issues. Other than promising future adjustments to force posture, American leaders have not outlined clear, common, regional objectives or shown any interest in trailblazing towards a long-term solution.
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This essay, on the other hand, argues that America should take a much more proactive role in pursuit of a peaceful and balanced end-state. A SCS strategy of sustainable engagement would focus on facilitating resolution of sovereignty issues and promoting equitable resource efficiently secure the maritime commons, while realistically engaging China as a regional power and hedging against its long-term intentions. The need to energize U.S. efforts in the SCS is acute-the geopolitical and economic stakes for 21 st century America overwhelm the anemic engagement to date.
This essay charts a new course through the troubled waters of the SCS by focusing on six states-the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC), Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and
Indonesia. It begins with a concise examination of those states' competition for natural resources and maritime access and then explores the sovereignty disputes that have driven both historical and current conflicts. Finally, the national strategies and relationships of each player are detailed and analyzed in both regional terms and in light of a fresh, proactive approach to U.S. involvement that raises American efforts to match the stakes involved.
Natural Resources
Although the quest for energy security will likely dominate the long-term pattern of SCS conflict, the need to balance marine resources drives persistent near-term tension. Competition for marine resources and fishing rights will continue as the most likely SCS flashpoint for three reasons. First, these resources have a significant economic impact; the PRC, for example, is both the world's largest consumer and exporter of fish. 7 Regional demand is also unusually highalmost 70% of SE Asians out of a population of 593 million are coastal dwellers who consume fish from the SCS. 8 Second, unsustainable fishing practices have brought SCS fisheries to a state of near-collapse, according to the United Nations Environmental Program. 9 The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center reports that the growing number of vessels, improved fishing technology, and illegal, unregulated fishing "obstruct all efforts of the region to conserve and maintain fish habitats and stocks for long term sustainability." 10 Third, regional governments are offering their fishermen incentive fuel and equipment upgrades to work further afield where fish stocks are more robust and contact is more likely with foreign law enforcement and naval vessels from other nations. 11 Historically, over half of SCS military clashes have concerned fishing boats or marine resources. 12 The spring 2012 standoff near Scarborough
Shoal between a Philippine warship and Chinese surveillance vessels concerning fishing boats in disputed waters caps a long line of similar incidents.
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While marine resources drive persistent volatility, the competition for SCS hydrocarbon resources holds more strategic merit for regional players. Although undersea oil and gas deposits are currently ambiguous in scope, their importance grows continually. Estimates of potential reserves vary widely-from 28 billion barrels of oil (BBL) by the U.S. Geological
Survey to 213 BBL by Chinese sources. 14 As a point of comparison, Saudi Arabia held 265 BBL of proven oil reserves at the end of 2011. 15 Unlike the resources of the Saudi desert, however, deep-water SCS oil and gas deposits require superior technology to exploit and can cost significantly more to extract. 16 Appendix 1 on page 20 shows the distribution of undiscovered hydrocarbons in the nine basins around the SCS. These potential energy sources are significant because Asia's remarkable economic ascent has pushed demand well past regional supply. If economic growth holds constant, Asian oil imports in 2030 will approach 30 million barrels per day, 80% of total global demand and just slightly less than the total production capacity of the Mideast. This growth is severely testing regional governments' abilities to sustain real-time energy needs and to secure future import streams.
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Freedom of Navigation
This competition for energy security is dependent on unhindered commercial access to the global commons, and the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the SCS are at the center of the network. In 2011, 15.2 million barrels of oil per day transited the Malacca Straits, just 10% less than the Strait of Hormuz. 18 In addition, $5.3 trillion dollars of waterborne trade (half of the global total by gross tonnage and one-third by monetary value) moves across the SCS SLOCs every year, with $1.2 trillion belonging to the U.S. 19 The security of that trade and unhindered access for all to the waterways has been sustained since WWII by U.S. military dominance. 20 The U.S. Navy's current maritime strategy declares that it "will not permit conditions under which our maritime forces would be impeded from freedom of maneuver and freedom of access, nor will we permit an adversary to disrupt the global supply chain by attempting to block vital The Paracels, also shown on Figure 2 , are claimed by the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
Practically, however, the PRC established local sovereignty over the eastern islands in 1956 and then seized the remainder from Vietnam in 1974 using military force. 28 Like the Spratlys, hydrocarbon deposits in the Paracels are only postulated. 29 Conversely, the final area of current contention is a section of the northern Natuna Gulf from which Indonesia is actively producing oil. The PRC claims overlap with Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the area, and it began contracting for exploratory drilling of its own in 1994.
30
States have bolstered their SCS territorial assertions in many ways: occupying and fortifying islets; building up submerged features; establishing structures and markers;
incorporating islands into governmental jurisdictions; and granting surrounding marine concessions to oil companies. 31 The legal foundation for maritime boundary delimitation, South China Sea arrived at basic principles to avoid disputes, but they sidestepped questions of geographic scope and a basis for enforcement. 35 Both documents envisioned an eventual binding code of conduct, but progress has been elusive. 36 As of the November 2012 East Asia Summit, the PRC continued to use inter-ASEAN political maneuvers to keep discussion on a code of conduct off the official agenda, to the consternation of the U.S. and most regional leaders.
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Strategies: People's Republic of China
With little prospect of a breakthrough on sovereignty disputes, and high stakes for freedom of navigation and resource development, each of the states concerned has deployed dynamic strategies for this important contest. However, the PRC stands out for a number of reasons-its claims are much more extensive, its ambitions for regional power status are more dramatic, and its capabilities dwarf those of its neighbors. 38 Inside the PRC, the number of often competing and poorly coordinated domestic actors that implement SCS strategy has proliferated to sixteen different government, military, and law enforcement agencies. 39 This creates inconsistencies at the tactical level of application and blurs the lines on how much policy is driven top-down and how much is reactionary. Despite this, Chinese strategy at the national level has been remarkably deliberate and consistent since the 1970s. 40 The PRC's public statements and its strategic actions highlight three key interests in the SCS: asserting sovereignty over all geographical features and possibly even the entire maritime space; ensuring access to natural resources; and securing critical SLOCs within the geographic domain. 41 These interests, all interrelated, are driven by domestic concerns that revolve around a common theme-internal social and political stability. China's preoccupation with sovereignty is partially a result of history and nationalism. The nation's dismantling and humiliation by Western powers and Japan over the previous 150 years drives the popular passions and civil unrest that often accompany territorial disputes in the SCS. 42 In addition, many commentators note that the Chinese Communist Party's ruling mandate is largely tied to the economy. The need for mass employment has led to an emphasis on low-end manufacturing and a heavy reliance on exports. Thus, secure access to the SLOCs that feed this export-dominated economy is intrinsically tied to domestic stability. 43 Likewise, the Chinese quest for energy security is also "rooted in the leadership's concerns that disruptions of oil supply could undermine the economic growth and job creation that underpin…stability." 44 Indeed, the need for additional offshore domestic resources in the SCS and for secure SLOCs to the Middle East is acute. In 2011, the PRC relied on imported oil for 56% of its total needs. 45 By 2025, 65% of those needs will pass through the Malacca Straits and the sea lanes of the SCS. 46 Taken together, all of these domestic issues-popular passions surrounding sovereignty issues, the criticality of both manufactured exports and energy imports, and the need for additional domestic energy sources-tie Chinese SCS interests directly to internal political and social stability. Thus, the reasons behind China's policy and its lack of compromise are evident-Beijing's moves in the SCS are beholden to the Communist Party's core interest in domestic stability. Leadership changes, like the one in 2012, are unlikely to result in greater flexibility.
Most pundits agree that China has been using a dual-track strategy to leverage national power towards its SCS interests. American leaders would call it smart power-the hard power of military means lashed to the soft power of public diplomacy and economic integration. 47 Some Southeast Asian officials have called it "talk and take." The result is a whole-ofgovernment approach that seeks to prolong diplomacy in order to maintain the status quo while simultaneously consolidating territorial claims and building military and economic power towards an end-state that remains ambiguous. Diplomatically, Beijing insists on intentionally unproductive bilateral discussions while vehemently rejecting the "internationalization" of the issues. The result is effective-almost no U.S. involvement, no coherent multilateral opposition, and no compromise to Beijing's key SCS interests. 48 Although a recent tactical shift towards multilateral engagement through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other ASEAN venues generated promise, 49 the PRC has consistently stalled any moves to implement real change.
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Implementation of the strategic track based on hard power is a work in progress, but the gravity of China's efforts and the opacity of its ultimate intentions have generated considerable regional controversy. Most notably, the PRC has steadily increased its physical presence in the SCS, primarily through civilian law enforcement agency vessels, but also with warships of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). 51 Economic coercion has been employed in territorial disputes, most recently in the quarantine of imported Philippine fruit during the Scarborough Shoal confrontation previously mentioned. 52 In addition, Beijing is actively building a series of strategic partnerships cemented around zones of forward Chinese presence-dubbed a "string of pearls" by Western analysts-that extends through the SCS and west to the Middle East. 53 This burgeoning forward presence is meant as an accompaniment to a robustly expanded and modernized PLAN capable of localized sea control. 54 The first successful landing of an indigenously produced J-15 fighter on the PRC aircraft carrier Liaoning in November 2012 symbolizes this effort. 55 "Even assuming it meets no countervailing responses in the region, however, China is at least a decade from amassing the type of preponderant naval power that can reliably deter U.S. intervention while cowing Asian navies," according to a prominent naval analyst. Thus, the military track of Beijing's smart power application is uncertain, tied to the economic prosperity that underwrites naval expansion, the difficulties inherent in organizing and training a dominant naval force, and the reciprocal force responses of other states. 
Strategies: ASEAN
The remaining states of interest-Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia-are by no means a consolidated block (Taiwan is not a member of ASEAN and is considered a renegade province, not a state, by the PRC). However, as small states in a regional system dominated by larger ones, each nation shares a common dilemma in balancing its own SCS interests against both the challenges and opportunities presented by the PRC's rise and the shifting regional attention of the U.S. 57 ASEAN and its various fora, such as ASEAN + 3 (Japan, PRC, and the ROK) and the ARF, have been the multilateral institutions of choice for substantive discussions on the SCS.
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The concept of complex engagement through a lattice of networks and relationships focuses on creating interdependence between ASEAN and the PRC, as well as shifting China away from a confrontational perspective in regional security matters. Importantly, ASEAN's consensual style drives distinct emphases on relationship-building over coercion and deterrence. 59 Indonesia's strategy has been to play the role of honest broker and mediator, both as the de facto leader of ASEAN and in the context of regional tensions over the SCS. It has no claim over any of the islands, and its relatively small EEZ overlap with China's claim has not been a source of significant friction. 69 In fact, Indonesia has led regional workshops on SCS conflict management since 1990, and Indonesian authorities continue to take the lead role in mediating inter-ASEAN and ASEAN-PRC issues concerning the SCS.
70
Strategies: The United States
America's heightened interest in the region is a result of the Obama administration's Asia-Pacific rebalancing, a policy shift that has been directed primarily towards Southeast Asia since 2009. 71 The U.S. certainly has vital economic and security interests in preserving the key elements of the status quo: free trade, secure SLOCs, and freedom for all nations to interact regionally and globally within the current rules-based international system. 72 The $1.2 trillion of U.S. trade that flows through the SCS annually has already been mentioned; conflict in the Sea could divert that cargo to other routes with longer transit times and increased insurance costs, harming the U.S. and its allies. In fact, secure SLOCs are at the heart of several abiding American interests. Partners in the region count on the U.S. to guarantee safe passage and freedom of navigation in the SCS and to uphold international maritime laws and norms. 73 In its 2012 Report to Congress, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission notes that "should China continue to press for acceptance of its interpretation of freedom of navigation within an EEZ, maritime security in Asia-fostered by a reliable U.S. military presence for decadescould be seriously undermined." Philippine claims in the SCS, 75 although the U.S. is bound to respond to "attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels and aircraft." The Taiwan Relations Act, which governs official commitments to Taiwan, does not formally commit the U.S. to defense of the island, although the two countries share a strong defense relationship. 76 In terms of pursuing these interests and commitments, the most recent articulation of U.S. strategy was from National Security Adviser Tom Donilon in November 2012. Diplomatically, the U.S. will work towards a stronger relationship with ASEAN and continue to support that organization's efforts to develop a SCS code of conduct. In addition, U.S. officials continue to reinforce key principles: "the need for peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of navigation, and a rejection of the threat, or use of, force or economic coercion to settle disagreements."
Militarily, the U.S. will add both presence and capability to the region by building up Guam as a strategic hub in the western Pacific, basing up to four Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, developing maritime security partnerships, and eventually positioning 60% of the U.S. Navy interests. Establishing "regional sovereignty" over the islands is one; granting primary sovereignty to the PRC while giving resource-related rights to the other claimants is another. In terms of jurisdiction, collaborative regimes worldwide have been established to share jurisdiction over natural resources-the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization is one multilateral example that manages a rich fishing ground outside any EEZ in the combined interests of all its members. 81 Although a variety of compromises have promise, only America wields diplomatic and economic levers of sufficient quantity and strength to push all the disputants towards a solution.
Build Partner Capacity
Although current U.S. strategy is dedicated to bolstering force posture in the western Pacific, it is not possible for one nation to provide security throughout the theater. 82 To be "sustainable" from a U.S. perspective in light of future fiscal constraints, the regional order must be anchored by American partners. Starting with current bilateral ties and building trust and confidence through partnering exercises to counter piracy and prevent terrorism, the U.S. can build a more distributed set of relationships and capabilities focused on burden-sharing. America should support the growing network of alignment that includes not only ties among Southeast
Asian nations but also links between Southeast Asia and other U.S. partners like Japan, Korea, Australia and India. Building such a cooperative security architecture while increasing the maritime capacity of partners around the SCS could provide safety and security to critical SLOCs less provocatively and at lower cost than other options. 83 In addition, these relationships could result in more strategic forward ports and basing opportunities for U.S. forces, like U-Tapao Airfield in Thailand, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and Subic Bay in the Philippines.
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Engage China from a Foundation of Strength
In addition to building partner capacity, the U.S. should pursue a more engaged policy of realpolitik with the PRC. While both sides should expect the political and diplomatic competition that accompanies China's rise, the mutual suspicion of long-term strategic intent denies reciprocal acceptance of each other's military security policies. "America's role as East Asia's security guarantor is an aspect of U.S. policy and strategy that feeds Beijing's suspicions," while the U.S. remains perennially suspicious of China's ultimate strategic intentions. 85 The best course of action is a hard-headed, even assertive, realism with respect to China "that actively supports rules-based cooperation; it avoids military conflict but not diplomatic confrontation." 86 In the context of the SCS, such a policy would engage the PRC at all levels: naval port visits, bilateral and multilateral sea exercises, officer exchange programs, and strategic dialogue at the highest government levels. The goal would be to reduce strategic distrust of long-term intentions and drive Beijing towards becoming a "responsible stakeholder...with a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success." 87 A successful U.S. strategy should lead with diplomatic and economic power, but it must be backed by credible military force. U.S. capabilities to project power into the SCS, both directly from the sea and from mainland and Asian bases, are fundamental to the U.S. role as a security guarantor and to all the other aspects of its strategy. 88 America must maintain a credible sea control capacity of the SCS SLOCs against the PRC's emerging anti-access and area-denial capabilities. Failure to do so would drastically change strategic assumptions and realities across the region.
89
Conclusion
Thus, a U.S. strategy of sustainable engagement would better serve American interests in the region by tackling the underlying sources of friction before conflict can shut down trade routes or engulf friendly militaries. The strategy envisions a more practical engagement with the PRC across all levels in order to ameliorate strategic distrust, recognize China's desire to lead regionally, and further its transition to responsible stakeholder status. In addition, burdensharing and partner development would help to create a new, sustainable paradigm for the engagement and U.S. leadership on the key drivers of conflict and tension-sovereignty and resource distribution-could create win-win scenarios of compromise.
American interest in achieving a durable outcome should be paramount. The SCS is the epicenter of seaborne trade and commerce for the new center of the global economy, and it holds lifelines of energy security for many of America's closest allies. Moreover, it has become a test of American power and will to continue to provide freedom and security to the common areas that have enabled global prosperity since WWII. Yet, regional tensions flare almost daily-over fishing boats, half-submerged rocks, and the like-creating opportunities for disaster. Only the U.S. has the diplomatic power and leverage to chart a course for peace amidst the scramble in the South China Sea. Figure 3 . Undiscovered SCS Oil and Gas Resources by Province (Oil in Millions of Barrels and Gas in Billion Cubic Feet of Gas; numbers represent a 50% chance of discovering at least the amount shown) 
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